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The Dismissal of MacArthur |
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MacArthur who did commit a fault in the judgment related to the intervention matter of the Communist Chinese troops made the position of the U.S. government seeking after an armistice difficult by continuously asserting the bombing, objecting to leaving the manchurian region of the Northeastern China a fortress. As the effort in a general meeting on the 14th of December in 1950 aiming at the armistice of South Korea by the committee of 3 members came to nothing, and 5 principles of Korean armistice decided by the political committee on the 13th of January in 1951 came to be rejected by the Communist China, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the resolution prescribing that China is an invader, by an overwhelming majority with 44 in favor, 7 opposed and 9 abstentions, according to the proposal of the United |
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States on the 1st of February. The embargo on the war supplies or arms over all the regions under the control of Communist China and North Korea was again resolved on the 18th of May. The Truman administration was indecisive, observing the war situation, in spite of having prospect that UN Force which again broke through the 38th parallel and had command of air could develop the favorable negotiation, as the strategy of UN Force came to be effective. Meanwhile, the discussion over the several months in terms of a foreign policy had been progressed in the U.S. Congress since November of 1950, and as the assertion of MacArthur was in the situation supported by Martin,J.W. who was the floor leader of the Lower House from the Republican Party, it seemed like the relation of tension between the U.S. administration and Congress. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff did force MacArthur, the field commander, to do a restrictive war by ordering the ban on bombing against Najin on the 21st of February in 1951, and also by commanding the ban on bombing against the developing facilities of China on the coast of the Yalu on the 1st of May. Even Truman made a decision of an armistice on the 38th parallel, and tried to begin the advantageous bargaining a little beyond the 38th parallel. At this point, MacArthur's military strategy pursuing only victory came to have trouble with Truman's foreign tactics searching after a bargaining. |
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Under the war situation being developed favorably, the U.S. State Department did consult with the Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the draft of the foreign announcement for the president containing the contents of an armistice on the Korean Peninsula, and obtained the approval from the dispatching countries on the 19th of March, while the next day delivered its purpose to MacArthur. MacArthur's response to this became just clear in his threatening statement against the side of communist on the 24th of March. In other words, those were the contents that if the United Nations would give up the purpose of the limited war and expand into the coastal or inland area of Communist China, the Communist China would come to face the risk of military collapse, and he would do his best aiming at seeking for all the military means |
| to achieve the political goal of the U.N. As this not only did not apparently pass a prearrangement with the government of his own country, but also seemed like a final notice, which perplexed Washington and which also created the echo to the dispatched Allies. The State Department directly made a statement criticizing for the utterance of exceeding power of MacArthur, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed to MacArthur by the direction of December 6, 1950 that the statement about the military and diplomatic policy should be approved prior by the State Department or by the Department of Defense. In that process, MacArthur lost the opportunity of addressing the diplomatic statement which proposed to continue war in Korea, and on April 5, Martin, a Representative, gave reading of the letter which MacArthur sent in the Lower House. Therefore the opposing relation between Truman and MacArthur was confronted by catastrophe. At last, on April 11, Truman addressed the dismissal of MacArthur through the exceptional midnight press interview. In succession of him, Ridgway, M.B. was appointed to the Commander of Eighth United States Army. Continuing since Wake Island Meeting, the conflict between Truman, the president, the supreme commander and MacArthur, the field commander, confirmed again the political order of USA that the civilian controls over the army to dismiss MacArthur. April of 1951 coming, the spring offensive led to 700,000 soldiers of large force. Against it, the counterattacks reiterating, the war became intensified. However because the government of USA set a goal of the limited war, the whole war situation fell in the deadlock. |
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