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| The Retreat of UN Forces |
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The Communist China's entry into the war was officially announced at the meeting of each one of national parties on the 4th of November, and the allied forces which temporarily held back due to the intervention of Communist China's Military Forces resumed the full-scale advance upon the Yalu on the 24th of November. MacArthur that day made the special announcement that the war reached its final stages. However, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States did suggest that the advance upon the coast of the Yalu be assigned to South Korean troops, and the remaining UN Force stop the attack in Cheongjin to the Northeastern area, with no getting to the border, yet MacArthur did not respond to this proposal. On the 25th and 26th of November right after the reopening of go-ahead of UN Force, the defense line was collapsed, as the Chinese army did come to attack the western front with a tremendous army of 18 divisions. Following a strategic meeting with the field commanders, MacArthur issued a special statement to the United Nations on the 28th of November, informing of the complete confrontation with a new war. That is, it became clear that the Communist Chinese troops over 200,000 soldiers were disposed against UN Force.
The general attack of UN Force came to an end within just 4 days, and the so-called retreat of December was made. Even though the National Security Council of the United States did examine whether they would allow MacArthur to have the right of bombing on Manchuria, yet it was denied by the judgment that Europe could be threat to the U.S. military power in front of the risk of expanding war, by triggering the intervention of Soviet Russia. Also, the request for a bargaining authority aiming at using 50,000 ~ 60,000 Taiwanese local troops suggested by MacArthur was rejected. The UN Force did repeat a retreat in the presence of the attack by the troops of Communist China, and there appeared a sign that the war situation would be reversed and extended over a long period. The North Korean army by virtue of the support of Communist Chinese troops did again advance south beyond the 38th parallel on the 26th of December. MacArthur requested a ground reinforcement of the United States, and presented a new political decision and a strategic plan. In the vortex of a defeat in a war, MacArthur did assert the full confrontation against Communist China, while he said he would support an armistice along the 38th parallel if Communist China would sympathize with. In other words, it was to establish the 2nd fighting line by blocking the coast of China and bombing Manchuria with the U.S. naval and air forces, and by committing the local troops of Taiwan to the Korean War, and at the same time by disembarking in the southland of China. However, the president Truman who did watch out for the danger of the all-out war could not accept this, rather, |
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he was more interested in the plan of withdrawal for UN Force from the Korean Peninsula. With discussing the countermeasure in relation to the probability of intervention by the Communist Chinese troops, this did express the firm attitude of considering the use of even atomic bomb on the Korean Peninsula, if necessary, on the 3rd of November, and the United Kingdom showed a deep concern about this. The statement finally issued by Truman and Atlee, C.R. on the 8th of December represented that every effort should be made for the purpose of achieve the goal of the United Nations on the Korean Peninsula by means of a peaceful way. This meant that the U.S. policy toward the South Korea at that stage came to be basically weakened. Such intention was recognizably surmised by the backing of the United States on the 12th of December when India submitted the resolution of organizing the committee of 3 members to the General Assembly, for the purpose of investigating the basic condition of Korean armistice by virtue of the support of 13 nations from Asia and Africa. The committee of 3 members at that time was composed of Entezam,N. Pearson,L.B. and Rau,B.N., representing Iran, Canada and India respectively in turn, and these people began a contact with Communist China. The committee of 3 members failed in the contact with the Communist Chinese government, and this was reported to the political committee of General Assembly. The reason Communist China assumed a negative attitude toward the truce of the Korean War was because the war situation was those days favorable to them, and they did advance south, keeping on pressing hard on UN Force.
The Communist troops again came to occupy Seoul, the capital, on the 4th of January in 1951, and the South Korean government together with its civilians came to join again in the refugee parade, advancing southwards, which was called 1. 4 retreat. Although Truman declared the national emergency situation on the 16th of December in 1950, yet it did little influence on the war circumstances, and the strategy of orderly withdrawal was the main issue. Even if MacArthur did continuously insist on the full confrontation reaching 4 items including the bombing against the industrial zone of Communist China, yet his opinion was not accepted, only heightening the sense of tension with his own country. Since the intervention of the Communist Chinese troops, the communists did continue to go south, and their supply route was expended, but those were blocked by the air attack of UN Force. From January 25 of 1951, UN Force kept on advancing, resuming a counterattack. They recaptured Incheon and Gimpo on the 10th of February, regained Seoul on the 14th of March, and broke through the 38th parallel on the 24th of March. |
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